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Abstract: This article examines the problems of benefit-cost (or cost-benefit) analysis in
our regulatory system and posits that a more nuanced version of the “non-delegation”
doctrine (made famous in Schechter Poultry) could improve many of the problems
associated with the use of benefit-cost analysis. In particular this article notes that many
of the problems with benefit-cost analysis are its use by agencies to make large policy
decisions, which could be characterized as legislative. The article also notes that though
the “non-delegation” doctrine may appear to be dead or dormant, that a form of it, in
separation of powers doctrine, exists in court review of agency action under Chevron
analysis. The article notes how Chevron and non-delegation, though from different
strands of analysis, can be seen as part of one separation of powers continuum.
Victor B. Flatt1
I.

A Law Professor and Benefit-Cost Analysis
Benefit-cost analysis (or cost-benefit analysis) is a discipline that tries to ascertain

the benefits and costs of a particular (usually public or governmental) action to ensure
that government expends resources in the best and most efficient way possible.2 It is
generally the province of economists and an attempt to improve its use will often be
focused on the technical execution of the process itself.3 Many pages of analysis have
been devoted to how benefit-cost analysis can more accurately predict or describe
information that we want to assist in government policy. But of course, the use of

1

Victor B. Flatt is the A.L. O’Quinn Chair in Environmental Law, and Associate Dean for Academic
Affairs at the University of Houston Law Center. He would like to thank Darren Bush, Frank Ackerman,
Lisa Heinzerling, Ron Krotoszynski, Dick Zerbe, Daniel Cole, and the participants of the University of
Washington’s conference ‘What Can We Do to Improve Benefit-Cost Analysis” for comments and
suggestions.
2
Theodore Porter, The Rise of Cost-Benefit Rationality as Solution to a Political Process of Distrust 3, at
http://depts.washington.edu/econlaw/papers.php, (on file with the author).
3
See e.g. Jared C. Carbone and V. Kerry Smith, Evaluating Policy Intervention with General Equilibrium
Externalities, and additional papers, at http://depts.washington.edu/econlaw/papers.php.

1

benefit-cost analysis for policy purposes rests within the framework of policy itself, and
in the United States, government policy is dictated by laws and the execution of those
laws. Therefore, in all of the economic studies that look at the effectiveness or
improvement of benefit-cost analysis, there is the underlying given that such a policy
must be consistent with law. But neither law nor its interpretation is static. Nor in its
broadest sense is law predictive or formulaic, though parts of it have been subject to
mathematical analysis, and much of its outcomes and goals can be explained by
economic theory.4 Therefore, one part of any discussion of benefit-cost analysis must lie
outside the realm of empirical data, and instead in the realm of advocacy- wherein certain
interpretations of the law are put forward as the “best” or correct ones because someone
wishes the result that would come about from that interpretation. Executive Order 12866
recognizes this by mentioning qualitative as well as quantitative factors.5
In this paper, I plan to enter that realm and provide reasoned arguments for why I
think that the law should be interpreted to restrain agencies from using benefit-cost
analysis as a way to make major policy decisions. I am going to assert that an
interpretation in this manner will provide a legal framework for benefit-cost analysis, that
I believe will move us more toward the result that provides information for the best
overall policy decisions based on that information.

II.

Introduction
The first step in this advocacy is to explain how benefit-cost analysis in policy is

related to law. A brief civics lesson would note that all laws of the United States
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government are to be made by a Congress, with presidential input.6 Similar state
constitutional doctrines underlie state lawmaking. Though many might wish our
lawmakers to use a specific analytic process for lawmaking, the process of making law
itself is not governed by benefit-cost analysis and is only limited by what powers and
exercising of that power is allowed in the Constitution.7 Although we may never know
fully what decisions go into the making of actual law, even if on an individual basis
legislators applied a rudimentary form of benefit-cost analysis, it would not necessarily
be informed nor would its analysis necessarily encompass all of the persons that it would
affect. Bismark’s remarks about the making of laws and sausages ring as true today as
they did 100 years ago.
According to certain theories of government and benefit-cost analysis, at least as
meant in the utilitarian manner, such a procedure may not be consistent with appropriate
government in any event.8 Instead, benefit-cost analysis as a discipline for government
action is a part of the Executive Branch, the branch that is charged with administering the
laws that are passed.9 Ideally, one would suppose that this means that whatever laws our
legislators feel should govern our people based on whatever theory of government, that
these laws should be administered in the best (i.e. most cost-beneficial) way possible.
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Benefit-Cost analysis in this way has become entrenched in our modern
administrative nation state.10 Since the early 1970s, every president of this country has
issued or followed an executive order requiring all agencies of the federal government to
use cost-benefit analysis in agency action, unless prohibited by law from doing so.11
Moreover, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires a cost-benefit analysis
of any agency action over $100 million, though it does not require the decision to be
based on that analysis.12
Despite its wide acceptance and usage, criticisms of benefit-cost analysis are
widespread.13These criticisms generally fall into two different categories: that there are
certain things that cannot be properly valued in benefit-cost analysis14, and the related
concern that certain things are not valued or considered at all.15 Both of these are of
particular concern in health, safety, and environmental regulation, where uncertainty dogs
many of the assumptions.16
The uncertainty in these areas is closely related to the concern expressed by
myself and others, that in its usage in dictating government policy, benefit-cost analysis
can be used illegitimately to produce a pre-determined outcome, favored by a particular
group or ideology, that may not actually be cost-beneficial, but can be justified because
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of measurement uncertainties.17 In other words, policy decisions are ostensibly made
using the uncertainties behind measurements needed for benefit-cost analysis.18
This concern has grown and enjoyed more widespread debate among academics
due to the perceived partisan nature of many policies of the current presidential
administration.19 Indeed, many commentators, while hardly critiquing the broad concept
of wanting the most beneficial outcomes possible in government action, would assert that
benefit-cost analysis as currently practiced is beyond redemption, and should be scrapped
or significantly replaced with other government decision making paradigms.20 Although
I will not dwell on these significant criticisms of benefit-cost analysis in this article, they
are real, are related to underlying partisan desires, and should not be ignored because they
do not fit neatly into the paradigm of benefit-cost analysis as an objective process.
Several papers at the first major cross-disciplinary conference on improving the use of
benefit-cost analysis (held at the University of Washington in May 2006) address this
troubling issue, and I believe a rigorous enforcement of legal doctrine might help, but I
believe it fair to say that any reforms or improvements suggested by supporters of
benefit-cost analysis must still grapple with its inappropriate use in practice.
Even assuming that all measurements could be conducted properly and were not
illegitimately swayed, there can still be fundamental questions about the role of
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government, and thus the role of benefit-cost analysis, in people’s lives. Much of this
debate centers around 2 core divides among policy makers and analysts: whether it is
possible, or even desirable, for government to make decisions rationally in a logical way
that is not beholden to partisan, group, or individual desires21, or whether the proper role
of government is to indulge the wishes and desires of the public as opposed to the
government doing the one, obviously, correct, and rational choice.22

The labeling of

something as a cost or a benefit may require ethical considerations. As pointed out by
my colleague Darren Bush, we generally define “efficiency” as a desirable result. But
efficiency means the lowering of production costs, which include wages. So by
determining to maximize some benefit may also require that we fail to maximize another.
Both of these come into play with the supposed tasks of administrative agencies
and the answers to these have much to say about the use of benefit-cost analysis.

III.

What do administrative agencies really do and what should they do?
It may seem like a trick question on an administrative law exam, but the question

of what administrative agencies do is not completely settled, and is germane to the use of
benefit-cost analysis. Do administrative agencies merely execute the law passed by
Congress or do they in some sense “create” the law themselves. In the recent case of
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n,23 seven justices of the Supreme Court made clear
that administrative agencies were empowered only to execute the law, not make it, but in
a separate concurrence, Justices Stevens and Souter proclaimed that it was a fiction to
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state that agency rulemaking power was executive rather than legislative.24 Moreover,
everyone recognizes that any executive action may have some policy effects and that
Congress explicitly tasks agencies with legitimate policy responsibilities.25
The question is important because the validity of benefit-cost analysis in agency
action depends on it. Critically, legitimate benefit-cost analysis assumes that an agency
can make an objective benefit-cost determination given specific facts, or apply the
process in a way that is value neutral.26 But what if the agency is asked to do more than
apply technical formulae to facts? What if it is asked to or seeks to answer basic policy
questions instead? While benefit-cost analysis might guide policy, it becomes much
more problematic if it is expected to create policy. This is because administrative
agencies are not directly subject to democratic control and popular will. While many
might think that non-democratic control is a good thing, it is not our system of
government, at least with value laden decisions.27
When an agency creates policy is when the most serious criticisms of benefit-cost
analysis come into play. What values will be considered? How do we decide those
values? How will they be measured? What kind of guidance from Congress is sufficient
to answer these questions but also accommodate the legitimate need and use of flexibility
in agency action without giving the power to make fundamental decisions that should be
made by Congress to agencies? The U.S. Constitution attempted to answer this question
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and it continues to be debated to this day. Nevertheless, I believe that a legal standard
can be articulated that can guide benefit-cost analysis and prevent some of its abuses.
A debate over the process of government raged at the time of our republic’s
founding as to what type of government we should have: that of popular will (the
“democrats”) or that of knowledgeable government agents (the “federalists”) which grew
out of the enlightenment thought. The broad disagreement at the founding of the
republic between the federalists and the democrats has been variously described as one
concerning the role of centralized power, and the appropriate role of the common man in
governance. In broad terms, those favoring more centralized power, believed in the
modern ideas of government by enlightened and educated individuals, and that
centralizing government meant that the best minds could be brought to bear on more
issues, whereas the democrats trusted the instincts of the common man, felt that the
process of democracy was morally uplifting and transformative, and believed that central
government was to be distrusted and limited.28 Echoes of this debate are part of the
benefit-cost discussion of today, where Professor Louis Wolcher notes that:
“CBA[cost benefit analysis] fails to consider the possibility that the coming-andbeing-together of political discussion and mutual learning in the context of policy
problems might be part of the good life itself, not to mention a catalyst that can
reshape the problems and the people’s feelings about them.”29
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compromise between the two ideals, and created a central government with strong
powers but only in certain areas, and in which three branches of government were to
ensure that the rights of persons were to not be trammeled by the central government. 30
The individual was to be protected by breaking up the power of the central government
into three distinct spheres: legislative, executive, and judicial, each with different roles.31
Checks and balances mean that the government must be accountable to the public, and
this is accomplished by having laws made only by those that are elected, and having that
process watched over by the judiciary.32 As stated by Rebecca Brown, “the principle of
political accountability can be understood as a way for people to protect their own
liberty.”33 A textbook answer to the role of administrative agencies would say how
administrative agencies are authorized under the power of the executive to “execute”, and
that this is how administrative agencies are supposed to work – in an executive
capacity.34 Policy and value decisions should be made in a public forum with inputs that
can affect results, such as a legislature.
In this framework, Congress creates basic policy and the executive branch
agencies “execute” it, because of the agencies’ expertise and the complexity and volume
of the tasks. 35 Though the legislature can always make a statute very specific and thus
control the exercise of the agency in its “execution,” in order to preserve efficiency,
Congress must often cede some discretion for policy implementation to the agency, and
thus the executive branch.36
30
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But the “textbook” answer and such compartmentalized roles are not always
accomplished in practice. This variance from the ideal is so great, many have suggested
that the “textbook” breakdown of power between the legislative branch and the executive
branch is a fiction.37
But assuming for the moment that we can make this distinction, it is in this power
sharing model that our founders actually addressed the questions of the appropriate role
of benefit-cost analysis in our government – in a constitutional law idea that has come to
be known as the non-delegation doctrine.

IV.

The Non-Delegation Doctrine
The non-delegation doctrine derives from the Constitutional requirement that all

laws be made by the Congress and President and not by any other basis.38 The principle
derives from the separation of powers issues described above and is based on the
Constitutional requirement that all “legislation” be promulgated by the legislative process
detailed therein.39
The first articulation of this in modern times as applied to administrative agency
powers occurred during the new deal era in a pair of cases: Schechter Poultry and
Panama Refining.40 In both of these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the
Congress and President had gone too far in giving power and discretion to the executive
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branch.41 The ruling was based on the fact that there was no intelligible principle to
guide agency discretion in the statutes at issue in the cases.42 In recalling the holding of
those cases, the Supreme Court recently noted:
“one of [the statutes] provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion,
and the other . . .conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis
of no more precise a standard that stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair
competition.’”43

Though many interpret these decisions as simply a rejection of the Roosevelt’s
administration expanded power, they also hearken back to the theoretical underpinnings
of the Separation of Powers doctrine - only the legislature should be the one to make
legislative policy. What are the dangers in legislation by other means? In his famous
concurrence in the OSHA regulation case, Justice Rehnquist noted that allowing policy
making power in the executive branch agencies made it nearly impossible for there to be
any democratic control on policy. 44 “The Constitutional doctrine prohibiting delegation
of legislative power rests on the premise that the legislature may not abdicate its
responsibility to resolve the truly fundamental issues by delegating that function to others
or by failing to provide adequate directions for the implementation of its declared
policies.”45 The people do not directly elect the decision-makers in an administrative
agency, and if they have been given power by Congress to exercise all discretion, the
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action cannot be challenged on statutory grounds. Thus, the non-delegation doctrine is
critical to maintaining the democratic balance created by the framers that ensure the role
of the public in government. Professor Krotoszynski stated it more directly by noting
that the non-delegation doctrine prevents Congress from attempting “to escape
responsibility for making hard choices.”46
Despite its importance, the non-delegation doctrine has rarely been invoked to
invalidate administrative action since the pair of Supreme Court cases noted above. But
the principle is still honored. In the most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court on
the issue, the court noted that Congress can give wide discretion to an administrative
agency, but still articulated the non-delegation doctrine as a valid limit on government:
“Article I, sec. 1, of the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted
. . . in a Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those
powers, Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d
36 (1996), and so we repeatedly have said that when Congress confers
decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative
act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is
directed to conform.’”47

Because it has only been used sparingly in overturning Congressional delegations
of power, many commentators declare the non-delegation doctrine to be dead.48 It is true
that in the modern administrative state, many of the delegations to executive branch
46
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agencies seem extraordinarily broad, and in many ways this is not necessarily bad. The
theory of administrative agencies posits that their purpose is to carry out all of the “detail
work” that elected officials cannot do, and that they possess more institutional expertise
than the Congress.49 In a highly complex system, a broad grant of power may be
necessary to accomplish the task efficiently.50 So a broad grant of power can still be
consistent with the vision of government as having an impartial central government that
works on expertise and a democratically elected government that makes policy decisions.
But even with broad discretion, the limit remains:
“Congress may wish to exercise its authority in a particular field, but because the
field is sufficiently technical, the ground to be covered sufficiently large, and the
Members of Congress themselves not necessarily expert in the area in which they
choose to legislate, the most that may be asked under the separation-of-powers
doctrine is that Congress lay down the general policy and standards that animate
the law, leaving the agency to refine those standards, “fill in the blanks,” or apply
the standards to particular cases.”51

So what does this have to do with benefit-cost analysis? If agencies are to only
execute laws, not create them, and only have flexibility to allow for an impartial
application of expertise (or to exert policy in only a limited and defined circumstance),
then the exercise of benefit-cost analysis would have nothing to do with major “policy
decisions.” Instead, benefit-cost analysis would be in the technical nature that its
proponents suggest, muting many of the criticisms of benefit-cost analysis that are based
49
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on the belief that it does involve significant policy decisions.52 By bringing rigor to the
Constitutional ideal of power sharing between the executive and the legislative branches,
and better enforcement of the respective roles of these branches set forth in the
Constitution, the judiciary, our third branch, could ensure a proper role of benefit-cost
analysis through a re-invigoration of the non-delegation doctrine.
Thus, however little it has been used, I do not believe that the non-delegation
doctrine is without meaning. Indeed, I believe that the concepts of non-delegation limit
agency discretion in such a way so as to address many of the concerns about the agency
use of benefit-cost analysis.
We start with the most recent statement of the doctrine as set out by the Supreme
Court:
It is true enough that the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies
according to the scope of the power congressionally conferred. See Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S., at 772-773, 116 S.Ct. 1737; United States v. Mazurie,
419 U.S. 544, 556-557, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). While Congress
need not provide any direction to the EPA regarding the manner in which it is to
define “country elevators,” which are to be exempt from new-stationary-source
regulations governing grain elevators, see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(i), it must provide
substantial guidance on setting air standards that affect the entire national
economy. But even in sweeping regulatory schemes we have never demanded,
as the Court of Appeals did here, that statutes provide a “determinate criterion”
for saying “how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.”53
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While this quote illustrates the broad depth of discretion that can be granted to an
agency, it also implies that certain critical decisions should not be made by an agency.
Even those justices who expressed the opinion that agencies actually exercise legislative
power noted that there must still be a limiting doctrine on the power of the agency.54 And
in his concurrence in the American Trucking judgment, Justice Thomas notes that there
are times that even with an intelligible principle, “the significance of the delegated
decision is simply too great” to be Constitutional.55 Though applied in different ways,
all of these positions from the Supreme Court’s most recent case on non-delegation have
one thing in common: they seem to recognize that critical policy decisions are to be made
by Congress. This connection of policy direction and the non-delegation doctrine was
explored at length in the famous Rehnquist concurrence in the “OSHA” case:
This uncertainty, I would suggest, is eminently justified, since I believe that this
litigation presents the Court with what has to be one of the most difficult issues
that could confront a decisionmaker: whether the statistical possibility of future
deaths should ever be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing
those deaths. I would also suggest that the widely varying positions advanced in
the briefs of the parties and in the opinions of Mr. Justice STEVENS, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice POWELL, and Mr. Justice MARSHALL
demonstrate, perhaps better than any other fact, that Congress, the governmental
body best suited and most obligated to make the choice confronting us in this
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litigation, has improperly delegated that choice to the Secretary of Labor and,
derivatively, to this Court.56

Though Justice Rehnquist’s explicit connection between the granting of too much
discretion garnered much interest as to whether there might be a revival of the nondelegation doctrine, and though it is consistent with the court’s most recent
pronouncement in American Trucking, there does not seem to be a realistic belief that the
non-delegation doctrine is useful in controlling agency action.57 However, I believe that
some of this commentary misses the mark, for in my opinion, the importance of nondelegation has been seen in cases that generally are not described as non-delegation
cases, but more described as cases that deal with an agency going beyond powers given it
by Congress.
Thus, the restriction on non-delegation as a manifestation of the separation of
powers could be seen as being addressed by common law and statutory restrictions on
agency discretion.58 This is more commonly known as the Chevron doctrine, which
allows agency discretion to be exercised only to the extent that it does not conflict with
Congressional direction.59
Chevron posits that agency actions that are not disallowed explicitly by Congress
can be upheld by a court on the assumption that it was a Congressional decision to give
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the agency the discretion to make this decision.60 But the exact parameters of Chevron,
particularly whether the court should always assume that Congress intended to grant an
agency broad authority, remain under debate.61 One of the Supreme Court’s experts in
administrative law, Justice Breyer, has suggested that rejections of agency interpretation
of statutes “might be rooted in the nondelegation principles, reflecting a reluctance to
take ambiguous provisions as grants of ‘enormous’ discretion to agencies.”62 Other
commentators have suggested a relationship between judicial scrutiny of agency exercise
of power and the non-delegation doctrine.63 I would agree with this assertion and further
argue that any analysis of agency authority involves the concept of separation of powers,
and in some cases is an explicit non-delegation question.
Although in our current legal environment, we tend to think of these as different
concepts, they are really two expressions of the same idea, the idea that major policy
decisions, whatever that means, are the province of the legislature, not the executive
branch.64 Whether an agency is following the grant of power from Congress in
implementing policy may thus be considered a question of non-delegation, for what is the
exercise of legislative power if it is not the agency’s exercise of power that it has not
been given by Congress. In this way, the analysis of whether an agency has followed
Congressional direction is the flip-side of the question of whether Congress has tried to
give the agency too much legislative power. The difference is that instead of it being
Congress that tried to force legislative power on the agency, it is the agency that has
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usurped legislative power. But both instances represent a violation of the separation of
powers, and thus a violation of the first principles of the non-delegation doctrine.
The court in American Trucking implies some connection between the two,
putting Congressional granting of power at issue in its application of the second step of
Chevron in that case:

“If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to that issue, then we must defer
to a reasonable interpretation . . . [w]e conclude however that the agency’s
interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is ambiguous and contradicts what
in our view is quite clear.”65[Emphasis added].

What does it mean to do something “unreasonable” on something that a statute is
silent upon? It cannot be judged by the terms of the statute because the statute is silent on
that issue. It can only mean going beyond the appropriate bounds of agency authority
generally, the non-delegation issue.
It is true that the different labels have given rise to distinctive judicial analyses of
the doctrines. For instance, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected the idea that an
agency could “cure” a non-delegation problem by generating a self-imposed limit on its
discretion neither contained in the statute itself or discernable from the statute, but in
Chevron analysis, when Congress is unclear in an area, the constitutionality is determined
by the agency’s reasonableness in interpretation.66

However, analysis of both non-

delegation and agency discretion are not uniform, and in the particular case noted above,
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the analyses can be reconciled by the notion of how much discretion and agency can act
within.
What is the lesson then from seeing the non-delegation doctrine as not only
Congressional thrusting of legislative power on an agency, but also an agency taking
legislative power? It means that our courts have been far more active in recognizing that
agencies engage in such behavior and are willing to police limits on the zone of
discretion. Since they are part of the same issue, what kind of standard does this create,
and how do we apply it to the problems of benefit-cost analysis?
In terms of a standard, it means that only Congress has the right and obligation to
set certain kinds of federal policy.67 Thus, the determination of overall governing policy,
as opposed to execution of policy, is not to occur in the executive branch. Though
Chevron recognizes that the agency may exercise discretionary choices when Congress
wishes it to do so, the deference to an agency ends there, and the non-delegation doctrine
ensures that there will be limits on how much discretion Congress can confer.
If this could be applied perfectly, it would mean of course that benefit-cost
analysis as a screen for policy decisions, or benefit-cost analysis that puts values on
things more properly considered in a policy forum would not be allowed at an agency
level, especially if the Congress has set out another metric to guide the administration of
the statute. Even if a statute ostensibly gives an agency the power to consider big issues,
if framed as the important question of policy, it probably should not be subject to benefitcost analysis. As noted by Rehnquist:

[T]he most difficult issue[s] that could confront a decisionmaker [is] whether the
67
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statistical possibility of future deaths should ever be disregarded in light of
economic costs of preventing those deaths. . .Congress [is] the governmental body
best suited and most obligated to make the choice . . .68

The court in American Trucking in reiterating the reach of the non-delegation
doctrine notes that Congress must provide “substantial guidance” on large or important
issues (such as regulations that affect the national economy).69 If we take this statement
at face value, and assume that life and death and human well-being must be the most
important issues of all, it seems that an agency cannot simply be making benefit-cost
decisions on these issues without significant input from Congress over what values must
be considered or how they are to be valued and weighed.

V.

But how can it be done?
Applying such as standard would still require a court to determine what Congress

had directed, what was major policy, and what was a legitimate exercise of benefit-cost
analysis by an agency, but putting it in this framework does direct a court as to what it
should be looking for and considering.
If it is true, as some claim, that there is empirical evidence of a bias of benefitcost application to routinely overprice agency actions implementing statutes to protect
human health and the environment, than a court should be able to take that as evidence of
a mis-use of the benefit-cost analysis to make a policy decision not legitimately given it
by Congress and thus to be engaging in the exercise of legislative power in violation of
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the non-delegation doctrine.
For instance, there is excellent evidence of routine over-estimation of costs of
environmental regulation. Frank Ackerman has methodically dismantled many of the
arguments that are used to oppose environmental protection on a benefit-cost basis.70
David Driesen’s empirical analysis of the use of benefit-cost analysis in health,safety, and
environmental regulation found that in no instances in the study data did the application
of benefit-cost analysis result in making a regulation more protective of human health
and the environment.71 Some economists claim that this is a benign bias caused by a
problem with measurement or assumptions, possibly because of the failure to assume
technological innovation in environmental protection.72 But this is not a problem that is
technically insurmountable.

Several of the papers at the University of Washington

conference explore the impact that changes in policy can have on measurement variables.
Moreover, the very fact of its application always causing less regulation suggests a bias.
As Professor Driesen notes, “if [CBA] moves regulation toward lesser stringency almost
all of the time, it cannot be neutral.”73
Therefore, one must assume that environmental costs are over-estimated because
decision makers are applying it in a policy-biased manner, something outside the scope of
power given by Congress, and in dealing with issues that concern how many lives to
save, a policy choice that should be made in Congress.
To cite another example, Robert Haveman’s paper on administrative manipulation
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of benefit-cost principles provides specific quantifiable ways in which the City of
Chicago’s proposed benefit-cost analyses submitted to the FAA for the O’Hare Airport
expansion project, violate minimal standards of economic analysis, and thus are
inherently suspect as correct or objective information.74
The problem in getting this kind of review, however, may be the attitude of the
courts themselves. Our courts may reflexively shy away from judging an application or
administration of a statute where numerical calculations are involved.75 Partly, this is due
to deference to an agency’s expertise.

“Agency determinations based upon highly

complex and technical matters are ‘entitled to great deference.”76
Moreover, in the application of the non-delegation doctrine the courts seem
reluctant to intervene and particularly loath to draw boundaries, perhaps because it seems
to shift too much power to the hands of the courts and risks the court’s imposition of its
own biases. As professor Krotoszynski has noted, the court’s reluctance to enforce the
nondelegation doctrine may be caused by doubts in its own capacity to make principled
judgments.77
The combination of these factors would seem to create skepticism at best that our
courts could start applying the non-delegation doctrine to limit the use of benefit-cost
analysis. However, there are positive signs that this could work. First, the application of
benefit-cost analysis is not in any particular agency’s expertise, and should not be given
deference because of this issue, which itself is based on a deference to supposed
74
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Congressional preference. In determining whether evidentiary numbers are accurately
used, a Court has as much expertise as an agency, and is called on to render such
judgments routinely.78
Haveman notes that the federal courts in the O’Hare example, when presented
with accurate data displaying flaws in the FAA’s application of benefit cost analysis, did
not hesitate to overturn the agency’s decisions based on those analyses.79 Moreover, the
American Trucking court’s discussion and reiteration of the non-delegation doctrine does
seem to create guiding standards which should not raise too many red flags when it is
used to overturn flawed or biased agency application. Merely defining a standard and
raising the issue means that a court could be made aware of this possibility. A skepticism
to benefit-cost analysis that demonstrates bias or less than best practices, would allow a
court to see when an agency is going beyond objective application of a statute and into
the arena of legislative policy, in violation of the non-delegation doctrine. Even if a court
doesn’t conceptualize the control of agency discretion in the APA as another version of
non-delegation, such bias in a particular direction would also indicate acting outside of
agency discretion contrary to law.
The courts could also fashion a simple judicial review that would allow the
agency to have deference on the use of cost-benefit analysis when Congress orders it, but
only as applied to the particular issue addressed by Congress; and generally not allow
decisions to be dictated by formalistic application of benefit-cost analysis when Congress
has been silent on a method of decision making or has specified another way to do so.
We have seen such examples in the application of many environmental laws, where
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Congress explicitly required particular kinds of technology or complete protection of
health, regardless of cost. In those cases, the courts have not been reluctant to prohibit
agency utilization of benefit-cost analysis in that realm.80
So courts have this power; they must just use it. Obviously, the courts themselves
may also have bias (whether intentional or not), but they do not have a structural
incentive to take power from the legislative branch to give to the executive branch.
Perhaps Congress could create “best practices” for benefit-cost analysis which could help
guide a court’s determination of whether an agency has overstepped the proper bounds in
application.

VI.

Conclusion
There is some hope for benefit-cost analysis as a tool if it is to be used in a precise

way. The criticism of benefit-cost analysis being manipulated and inadequate for certain
kinds of analyses is correct. What is striking is that agencies should not be engaged in
this kind of manipulation of policy making in the first place. It is a violation of the
separation of powers doctrine in our Constitution, and this determination could be made
by a rigorous application of the non-delegation doctrine to such agency action. All it
requires is for our court to recognize the proper standard that governs what an agency can
and should be engaged in when applying benefit-cost analysis and then a willingness to
examine so-called “objective” evidence for accuracy. Doing this might go a good ways
in curbing abuses of benefit-cost analysis and improve its use in practice.
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